W&M ScholarWorks
VIMS Articles

Virginia Institute of Marine Science

2022

Attitudes and behaviors for understanding compliance in
Greenland's Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) fishery
Hunter T. Snyder
Rodrigo Oyanedel
Christopher S. Sneddon
Andrew M. Scheld
Virginia Institute of Marine Science

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/vimsarticles
Part of the Aquaculture and Fisheries Commons

Recommended Citation
Snyder, Hunter T.; Oyanedel, Rodrigo; Sneddon, Christopher S.; and Scheld, Andrew M., Attitudes and
behaviors for understanding compliance in Greenland's Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) fishery (2022).
Conservation Science and Practice.
doi: 10.1111/csp2.12775

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Virginia Institute of Marine Science at W&M
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in VIMS Articles by an authorized administrator of W&M
ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu.

Received: 21 July 2021

Revised: 1 June 2022

Accepted: 13 June 2022

DOI: 10.1111/csp2.12775

CONTRIBUTED PAPER

Attitudes and behaviors for understanding compliance in
Greenland's Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) fishery
Hunter T. Snyder1
Andrew M. Scheld

| Rodrigo Oyanedel2 | Christopher S. Sneddon3,4

|

5

1

Thayer School of Engineering,
Dartmouth College, Hanover, New
Hampshire, USA

2

Department of Zoology, Interdisciplinary
Center for Conservation Science,
University of Oxford, Oxfordshire, UK

3

Department of Geography, Dartmouth
College, Hanover, New Hampshire, USA

4

Department of Environmental Studies,
Dartmouth College, Hanover, New
Hampshire, USA

5

Virginia Institute of Marine Science,
Gloucester Point, Virginia, USA
Correspondence
Hunter T. Snyder, Thayer School of
Engineering, Dartmouth College,
Hanover, NH, 03755-3529, USA.
Email: hunter.gr@dartmouth.edu

Funding information
Association of Hunters and Fishers in
Greenland, Grant/Award Number: Lakse
Fond; National Geographic Society,
Grant/Award Number: EC-53874C-18;
National Science Foundation, Grant/
Award Number: NNA Track 1:
Innovations in Energy Technologies an

Abstract
Noncompliance is a central challenge for conservation, but in settings with
limited access to behavioral data, it can be difficult to evaluate what drives
compliance. Conservationists can measure and evaluate resource users' attitudes, and in so doing, leverage a complementary, nonbehavioral measure for
evaluating compliance. In Greenland, wild Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) fishers are under increasing regulatory pressure to report salmon catch because
the majority of North Atlantic salmon stocks are classified as suffering. The
objective of this study is to measure salmon catch reporting compliance,
reporting behavior, and attitudes toward Greenland's salmon management.
We surveyed Greenland's licensed salmon fishers, used an unmatched count
technique to estimate the incidence of underreporting salmon catch, and
linked salmon fishers' actual catch reports to their survey responses. In 2019,
more than 84% of salmon fishers reported their catch and demonstrating high
levels of compliance. We also found that salmon fishers did not indicate strong
instrumental motivations for reporting, but exhibited moral obligations and
normative, legitimacy-based motivations to report catch. Salmon fishers found
regulations to be fair, and that regulatory authorities were professional and
acted honestly. Catch underreporting was also remarkably low, with 90–94% of
respondents stating that they report all their catch. Joining together individuals' attitudinal and behavioral responses to conservation rules illustrates the
benefits and limitations of expanding actor-based theories of compliance. This
case of already high levels of compliance offers empirical evidence for further
improving fisheries compliance, and it also illustrates the limitations that fishery managers face when conserving a highly migratory species.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Noncompliance is a central challenge for sustainable fisheries (Fulton et al., 2011; Raakjær Nielsen, 2003) and
effective conservation interventions among local communities more broadly (Agrawal, 2014; Erbaugh et al., 2020;
Nolte et al., 2013). How to assess noncompliance information requires specific conceptual approaches from
diverse
literatures
and
disciplines
(Oyanedel
et al., 2020b). Fortunately, compliance is a core tenet of
fisher behavior, and actor-based approaches, for instance,
include models that attempt to explain an individual's
behavioral motivations for complying or not with conservation rules (Oyanedel et al., 2020a). Actor-based
approaches include instrumental, normative, and
legitimacy-based factors for compliance (RamcilovicSuominen & Epstein, 2012). Measuring motivations for
behavior is key for evaluating compliance in conservation
settings and fisher behavior (Andrews et al. 2021; Fulton
et al., 2011). Expanding this work in settings of smallscale fisheries and for reporting compliance is needed in
values-oriented settings where motivations extend
beyond instrumental factors for compliance (Andrews
et al. 2021; van Putten et al. 2012).
In conservation settings where behavioral data cannot
be easily collected, it would be valuable to know what
resource users think about the regulations that govern
their activities. To use motivations to explain behaviors
may be possible because theory in social psychology and
behavioral economics have been advanced in part by
demonstrating empirically that there are strong relationships between peoples' motivations, or attitudes, and
their behaviors (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980;
Andreoni et al., 1998; Kosinski et al., 2013; Kraus, 1995).
Building upon theoretical and methodological developments from the behavioral sciences would advance the
science and practice of conservation, and in particular,
theoretical advancements for the study of compliance in
small-scale fisheries (Cinner, 2018). If both measures of
motivations and behavior could be collected, it may be
possible to predict certain kinds of compliance in other
conservation settings where behavioral measures are not
available (Arias & Sutton, 2013; Bergseth et al., 2018).
This predictive power would be especially valuable in
data-poor, natural resource management settings (Ban
et al., 2009; Honey, 2010; Kelleher et al., 2012). One such
area with incomplete, missing, hidden, or poor quality
data (Kelleher et al., 2012) is among small-scale fisheries,
where communities' livelihoods depend upon sustainable
fisheries and where there is limited capacity for monitoring and enforcement (Allison & Ellis, 2001; Béné
et al., 2016; Smith & Basurto, 2019). Collecting both measures of motivations and behavior within the same small-
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scale fishery would help close this knowledge gap and
create generalizable lessons about the usefulness of motivations as predictors for compliance.
Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) stocks occupy a large
range in the North Atlantic. As an anadromous finfish,
they inhabit freshwater riverine systems early in their life
history, enter the marine environment primarily to feed,
and ultimately return to their rivers of origin to spawn
(Fleming, 1996). Atlantic salmon are one of the most
widely sold farmed finfishes (Cai et al., 2017), but their
wild counterparts in the North Atlantic are approaching
collapse (Dadswell et al., 2021; Parrish et al., 1998). There
is consensus that drivers of declines are challenging to
identify, but that fishing mortality, spawning habitat,
dams, and other coastal development may play a role
(Dadswell et al., 2021; Sheehan, 2019). Salmon conservationists and biologists alike agree that understanding
human dimensions of salmon is key to mitigating the
threats that salmon face (Dadswell et al., 2021; Thorstad
et al., 2021). In Greenland, Atlantic salmon serve a documented role in household subsistence and are culturally
significant (Poppel & Kruse, 2009; Inger Katrine DahlPetersen et al., 2014; Hickey et al., 2021). As a result, a
subsistence fishery continues with private and professional fishers. Fishing-based mortality of salmon is especially concerning to Atlantic salmon conservationists
(Dadswell et al., 2021; Sheehan, 2019). Compounding the
uncertainty of stock declines, little is known about the
drivers of compliance nor of the attitudes toward salmon
fishery regulations. This knowledge deficit is especially
relevant and addressable in Greenland's Atlantic salmon
fishery, one of the few remaining Atlantic salmon
fisheries.
Since the 1950s, Greenlanders' fishing for wild Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) has been internationally controversial. Discrete salmon stocks throughout the North
Atlantic are connected by both their life history and
through political and management institutions because
salmon travel through several territorial waters throughout their life history (Bubier, 1988). Within the territorial
waters of North Atlantic coastal states in North America
and Europe, conservationists, fishers, and fishery managers have held diverse and at times conflicting priorities
for how salmon stocks should be used, protected, or
improved (Editorial, 1981). While consensus on management areas has been reached, and resource user compliance has improved, the population outlook for wild
Atlantic salmon remains discouraging. Drivers of compliance and the specific features of the governance system,
then, are central to sustainably and justly managing
Greenland's Atlantic salmon fishery, and in so doing mitigating Atlantic salmon collapse (Dadswell et al., 2021;
Thorstad et al., 2021).
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Data on catch reporting in Greenland's salmon fishery suggests that levels of compliance have increased in
the last 3 years, and catch data has been available for several decades (Government of Greenland, 2020). However,
no replicable estimate of salmon catch underreporting
among salmon fishing license holders has been conducted. Recent literature suggests that many environmental compliance issues are because of omission, such
as failing to report catch (Huisman & van Erp, 2013). In
addition, we know little about the drivers and which specific management features of the governance system may
be facilitating high levels of compliance.
There are several relevant actor-based theories that
may help us understand compliance in Greenland's
Atlantic salmon fishery. Ramcilovic-Suominen and
Epstein propose a compliance framework, which delineates instrumental, normative, and legitimacy-based
motivations for compliance (Ramcilovic-Suominen &
Epstein, 2012). Instrumental motivations may manifest
in a salmon fishers' calculation of the costs and benefits
of complying with salmon conservation rules (Becker &
Landes, 1974; Sutinen & Andersen, 1985). Normative
motivations, such as a fishers' sense of morality and how
resource users perceive each other, are known to exist
among small-scale fishers, because they are often interdependent and share other key group characteristics
(Arias & Sutton, 2013; Bergseth & Roscher, 2018;
Nelson, 1982; Ostrom et al., 2002; Thomas et al., 2016), so
there is reason to believe that Greenland's salmon fishers
are also motivated by normative factors. Legitimacybased motivations may be at play in Greenland, as they
are known to be key across fisheries (Karper &
Lopes, 2014; Kuperan & Sutinen, 1998; Sandström
et al., 2014) and in particular among small-scale fisheries
(Oyanedel et al., 2020a; Snyder et al., 2020). Measuring
fishers' attitudes toward these regulatory changes and
their behavioral responses may allow us to explain compliance in Greenland's salmon fishery. Here, we use
actor-based approaches to interpret and explain compliance with measures of attitudes and behavior. Our
hypothesis is that individuals' attitudes provide key
insights on how they behave in the immediate regulatory
environment in which their resource use occurs. In addition, we hypothesize that nonreporters have systematically different attitudes or perspectives to those who do
report salmon catch.
Theories of compliance in conservation guide our
understanding of salmon fishers' compliance, and they
help to clarify the role that attitudes or motivations could
play in this understanding. Elements of actor-based theories of compliance can illuminate how and why fishers
follow the rules in Greenland's salmon fishery, and
which attitudes or behaviors are associated with crimes
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of omission. This is necessary because in fisheries, we
know little about crimes of omission when compared
with a recent study of crimes of commission (Bergseth &
Roscher, 2018). Addressing this knowledge deficit is especially relevant given the increasing reliance upon accurate catch reports for effective fisheries management
(Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, 2012).
Understanding the extent of compliance is the first
measure to identify for understanding the drivers of compliance (Conteh et al., 2015; Snyder & Erbaugh, 2020).
However, respondents may be reluctant to share why they
choose not to comply with catch reporting or other salmon
fishery regulations. We must ethically resolve these challenges because we wish to hear the most from people who
exhibit noncompliant behavior. To ask resource users
directly about sensitive matters, such as their willingness
to report truthfully, can lead to doubt over the truthfulness
of responses. To resolve this issue so we can understand
the extent of noncompliance, we employ indirect questioning. Indirect questioning techniques as described below
help resolve the challenge of asking sensitive questions
(Hinsley et al., 2019). Indirect questioning makes it possible to estimate sensitive behaviors with a high level of
accuracy while also respecting a persons' desire to share
information in a manner that is not ostensibly revealing.
Doing so also meets ethical criteria for protecting respondents' identities. Information on the specific indirect questioning techniques are set forth below.
Once the extent of the noncompliant behavior is estimated, it becomes possible to explore how legitimacybased motivations are associated with such behaviors.
Catch reporting requirements can be understood as their
input, throughput, and output legitimacy. Our study
focuses on throughput legitimacy because how catch
reporting requirements are carried out by resource users
and processed by fishery managers is an area for which
we know very little, especially when compared with the
known input (Hickey et al., 2021) and output factors
(Snyder et al., 2021) of legitimacy in Greenland's salmon
fishery. A study that specifically identifies the extent to
which people do not report salmon catch and their reasons why can help improve the processes that underpin
the success of Greenland's management of Atlantic
salmon fishing.

2 | METHODS
2.1 | Survey pool
Our research objective was to evaluate compliance in this
fishery by understanding the relationships between
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salmon fishers' reported fishing behavior and their attitudes. We use responses to a survey as a measure of attitudes, and salmon catch records as a measure of actual
behavior. In 2019, we developed an anonymous, IRBapproved nationwide online survey instrument on
salmon fishing in Greenland (STUDY00031018). We
drew our survey pool from all 2019 salmon fishing license
holders. Salmon fishing license holders were classified as
either private or professional fishers (see Supplementary
Materials for breakdown of license types and regulations). We queried their contact details with assistance
from Greenland Fisheries License Control Authority
(GFLK). GFLK sent us contact details including phone
and email, with personal identifiers removed. License
holders were assigned a unique but anonymous identifier
code to access the survey. We later used this code to link
survey responses with anonymized 2019 salmon catch
records for each individual.

2.2 | Survey design
Survey questions were drafted in English, reviewed by
two recreational fisheries survey experts and a member
of staff from the Association of Hunters and Fishers in
Greenland (KNAPK). The survey was reviewed by Greenland Fisheries License Control Authority (GFLK) and the
Government of Greenland Fisheries Department
(APNN). Survey questions were broken into sections and
were formatted to include Likert, number entry, multiple
choice, and open text questions. The survey sections
included introductory questions, asking fishers about
how much experience they have had harvesting from the
sea and land, familiarity with current salmon regulations,
and how they utilize their salmon catch. We also asked
fishers to identify how they report, how difficult each
reporting option (e.g., by phone, by mail, by fax) is for
them, and their reasons for not reporting, if any. We conclude the survey by asking fishers about their attitudes
toward the regulations, the enforcement authorities, and
the survey instrument (to view the full survey, see
Supplementary Materials).
Survey questions were translated into Danish and
Greenlandic by a native Greenlandic speaker. The survey
questions, including the UCT, were trialed for quality
assurance of translations, user experience, and content,
on nine persons familiar with salmon fishing but who
did not have a 2019 salmon fishing license and therefore
were not part of the sample. The survey was drafted and
distributed in March 2020 using Qualtrics and was available in Greenlandic, Danish, and English. The online survey was distributed via email and SMS message to 500 of
the 719 salmon fishing license holders. 219 salmon
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fishing license holders did not have contact information
and could not be enrolled. The UCT groups were randomly assigned in R, and a group code (Group 1 or 2)
assigned to each individual. Qualtrics read in this value
and displayed the correct UCT statements for the group
for which the individual was assigned. After the invitations were sent to the effective sample of 500, three
reminder messages were sent by SMS and email to
encourage participation. Five prizes of DKK 2000 or
approximately USD 330 to a general store in Greenland
were pledged. After the survey was completed, we randomly drew five respondents, each of whom were
awarded a raffle prize. The survey closed 29 May 2020
(Figure 1).

2.3 | Unmatched count technique
Calculating the incidence of catch underreporting is not
possible with salmon catch records alone, but it can be
estimated with Unmatched Count Technique (UCT) as a
component of the survey. UCT is a popular, quasiexperimental technique for indirectly asking sensitive
questions (Hinsley et al., 2019), which can reveal illegal
behaviors, such as underreporting. With UCT, respondents are broken into a treatment and control group.
Both groups are asked to indicate how many statements
from a list of statements are true for them, but not which
exact statements. For the treatment group, a sensitive
statement is also added. If the treatment and control
groups are randomly assigned, the difference in the
means between the groups can reveal the prevalence of
the sensitive statement among the overall population
(Coutts & Jann, 2011).
The use of UCT in fisheries cases has been limited to
date (Bergseth et al., 2017), but is a simpler alternative to
other methods, such as random response techniques
(RRT) (Oyanedel et al., 2020a; Thomas et al., 2015). With
UCT, we can ask respondents to indicate how many but
not which behaviors they have engaged in from a list of
other plausible behaviors, thus allowing underreporting
behavior to be indicated indirectly (Droitcour
et al., 2004). Using double-list UCT, we are able to evaluate underreporting of catch in a smaller study population
(Glynn, 2013), because with double-list UCT, both the
treatment and the control groups are given a sensitive
statement, but with two separate UCT exercises, which
improves UCT method efficiency. UCT's are also prone to
floor and ceiling effects depending upon the content of
the statements. Floor effects can occur if the nonsensitive
statements provided are all so rare that the sensitive
statement is the only plausible statement, and respondents over-report their true answer to conceal the
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F I G U R E 1 Map of the distribution
of Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) at
Greenland. Map by author.
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sensitive statement. Conversely, ceiling effects can occur
if the nonsensitive statements provided are all too common, which can cause respondents to under-report to
avoid admitting directly to the sensitive statement. To
avoid these potential issues, the selected UCT statements
were also reviewed during the initial survey review process (Hinsley et al., 2017). During the survey review, we
included at least one nonsensitive item that was deemed
to be rare so as to avoid the possibility of a ceiling effect.
We also included a warm-up question so respondents
were less likely to answer the UCT question improperly.
We were further able to ensure participant privacy
and encourage participation because the survey could be

40°W

taken online in a place of the informant's choosing. We
estimated how often salmon fishers' did not report their
salmon catch using both direct and indirect questioning,
anticipating that fishers would be reluctant to honestly
answer a direct question about reporting salmon catch
(Coutts & Jann, 2011).

2.4 | Analytical techniques
We analyzed 2019 salmon catch records, and responses
to the salmon fishing survey, including the UCT experiment responses. Survey responses served as a measure of
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individual salmon fishers' attitudes, and their individual
catch records from 2019 served as a measure of their
actual fishing behavior. We used RStudio version
1.2.5042 (R version 3.6.3) to summarize catch records for
each license holder, and then joined them to the
186 salmon fishing survey responses.
Because we did not receive survey responses from
533 salmon fishers, there was a risk of nonresponse bias.
Using Stata version 15 and R version 3.6.3, we evaluated
the possibility of nonresponse bias by comparing the survey population (n = 186) to the entire sample (N = 736),
according to four key variables: fishcount (how many
salmon each fisher caught), catchkg (how much fish each
fisher caught), locality (the municipality where a fisher
resides), and licensetype (either a recreational or professional fisher). A Pearson's Chi-squared test was performed on locality and licensetype and a Two-sample
Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann–Whitney) test was performed
on fishcount and catch, in light of a right skew
distribution.
To evaluate whether fishers who report have similar
or different attitudes to those who do not report, we conduct a Light Cohen's Kappa test on Likert scale questions
to measure levels of agreement between questions and to
potentially combine variables. We also create box and
whiskers plots to depict the distribution of responses
between fishers who did and did not report their salmon
catch, for selected predictor variables. For questions
where mean responses vary, we fit binomial general linear models (GLM) to detect significant differences
between fishers who did and did not report their salmon
catch. We fit the GLM to test the question of whether
nonreporters have similar or different attitudes than
reporters. We are motivated to test this because we could
not anticipate whether the survey pool would consist of a
balanced sample of fishers who reported and fishers who
did not report salmon catch. To know these differences is
also valuable to the targeted design of fisheries management, so as to avoid any change that would attempt to
correct behavior among a small group while disproportionately affecting an otherwise compliant population of
salmon fishing license holders.
The anonymous identifier code created by GFLK
made it possible to anonymously compare individual
fishers' behaviors, in terms of their reported salmon catch
records with attitudinal responses from survey questions.
UCT responses cannot be linked to individual attitudinal
responses because UCT estimates use the treatment and
control groups—and not individual responses—as the
unit of analysis.
To analyze results, we created frequency statistics for
the direct question (Did you report all of your catch in
2019?). To estimate the prevalence of catch
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underreporting with the double-list UCT, we used rgr
and list packages in the R programming environment
(R Version 3.6.3). We calculated the means for both the
control question and sensitive question, calculated the
overall estimate by average difference of means (see
Equation 1). The equation, following Coutts & Jann
(2011) and Hinsley et al. (2019), is as follows
(Equation 1—Formula for double-list unmatched
count [UCT]):
p¼

p1 þ p2
2

ð1Þ

where px = mean(treatment groupx)  mean(control
groupx), where p1 and p2 are the proportion of of participants engaged in sensitive behavior from list 1 and
2, respectively.

3 | RESULTS
In 2019, 84% of all salmon fishing license holders
reported at least some of their salmon catch, up from 33%
in 2017. From the effective sample of 500 salmon fishing
license holders, 186 or 37% participated in the survey. A
Pearson's chi-squared test showed that there were no significant differences between the effective sample and the
survey pool, according to where fishers reside (locality,
p = .1364). A Pearson's Chi-squared test with Yates' continuity correction suggests that there were no significant
differences between license types (licensetype, p = .522).
A two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann–Whitney) test
suggests that how many salmon they caught (fishcount,
p = 0.07) and how much fish they caught (catchkg,
p = 0.06) are also not significantly different.
Greenland's salmon fishers exhibit a diverse range of
fishing experience, many with no experience to some
with over 50 years of experience (x̄ 33.6 years). From
within this pool of seasoned salmon fishers, it is perhaps
unsurprising that <5% of respondents did not know
about the salmon fishing regulations set forth in the 2018
Executive Order on the Fishing for Salmon. The survey
pool also had an overwhelming familiarity with reporting
animal harvests from the land and the sea, with <9% having no previous experience doing so. Among these 14 fishers with no previous experience, only one did not report
their salmon catch. Asking for their perspective on the
ecology of salmon, most respondents (83.7%) thought that
salmon stocks at Greenland were healthy, and disagreed
that the arrival and location of salmon had changed in
2019. Given that the survey was issued to salmon fishers,
it also comes as no surprise that the majority of salmon
fishing license holders find salmon to be important or
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1. If I didn’t report, I would feel guilty.

16%

6%

78%

2. Regulations are fair and equitable.

21%

14%

65%

3. Regulations are appropriate.

20%

16%

64%

4. Authorities are professional and act honestly.

16%

26%

58%

5. If I didn’t report, friends/colleagues would
disapprove.

29%

17%

55%

6. If I didn’t report, I would receive a severe
fine.

35%

16%

49%

7. I should report because a hunting/fishing
officer is in the area.

33%

20%

48%

8. Fishermen do not report all their catches.

37%

23%

40%

9. Local hunting and fishing officers are
available or visible in my area.

48%

15%

37%

10. If I didn’t report, I would get caught.

48%

18%

34%

11. If I didn’t report, I would get more
fish/profit.

80%

10%

10%

100

50

0

50

100

Percentage
Response

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat Agree

Agree

Strongly Agree

F I G U R E 2 Responses to survey questions on instrumental (statements 6, 10, 11), normative (statements 1, 5, 7, 8, 9), and legitimacybased (statements 2, 3, 4) factors. Data: 2019 Salmon fishing survey.

very important as a Greenlandic food source as well as a
source of income, suggesting noninstrumental factors at
play in this fishery system.
The main survey results are presented in Figure 2.
The majority of respondents found salmon fishing regulations to be fair, equitable, and appropriate, with the
authorities that enforce them to be professional and honest. Concerning fishers' normative attitudes, respondents
indicated strong moral obligations to report. Their sense
of guilt for not reporting had the highest frequency
response of any question asked. Respondents either disagreed or had neutral positions on their salmon catch
reporting being driven by instrumental motivations. 80%
disagreed with reporting driven by profit possibilities,
48% disagreed with reporting driven by the likelihood of
getting caught, and 35% disagreed with reporting driven
by the likelihood of receiving a severe fine.
When we linked fishers' catch records to their survey
responses, we observed that 91% of survey respondents
were reporters. That is, the vast majority of survey
respondents also reported their salmon catch in 2019.
The imbalanced survey pool raises the question of
whether nonreporters, who comprised 9% of the survey
respondent pool, have similar or different attitudes than
reporters. Results of the binomial GLMs suggest that
most responses to survey questions do not differ significantly among reporters and nonreporters. However,

significant differences were observed for two questions
about why fishers do not report. Nonreporters were more
likely to agree that they did not know how to report, with
a coefficient estimate of 1.39 (p < .000; CI .72–2.23) and
that reporting is confusing, with a coefficient estimate of
0.88 (p = .006; CI .25–1.55). While less significant, nonreporters were also more likely to indicate that they see no
benefit to reporting, that they do not have access to the
internet or to a phone, that they have no time, and that
they do not trust the government. The perception that
salmon catch reports being used against fishers was not
found to have a systematic relationship with a fishers'
report status (p = .06; CI .13–1.49).
While we focus primarily upon salmon catch reporting requirements, there are three major regulatory provisions: fishing within the season; gear limitations; and
reporting salmon catch. In response to direct questions,
5.8% of fishers indicate using more nets that are allowed,
6.4% of fishers indicate fishing before or after the designated salmon season, and 5.9% of fishers said that they
did not report all of their salmon catch. Of the 17 respondents who did not officially report salmon catch to the
Government of Greenland, only two indicated in the survey that they did not report all of their salmon catch,
nine choosing not to answer, and six said that they did,
on the contrary, report all of their catch. 145 salmon fishers answered the UCT questions, which revealed that
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T A B L E 1 Results of direct and UCT question “Did you report
all of your salmon catch in 2019?”
Question type

Estimated incidence (%)

n

SD (%)

Direct

5.92

152

2.4

UCT

9.99

145

8.3

Note: Data—2019 Salmon fishing survey.

10% of salmon fishers did not report all of their salmon
catch (n = 145, estimate .099, SD .0828). The direct question and UCT results are drawn from different sample
sizes and units of analysis. However, the standard deviations of each estimated incidence can be evaluated and
suggest that they are not significantly different from each
other (Table 1).

4 | DISCUSSION
We estimated that nearly all of Greenland's salmon fishers comply with salmon fishery regulations, especially
salmon catch reporting. Specifically, the 2018 Executive
Order on the Fishing of Salmon required salmon fishing
license holders to report, or else lose their license renewal
for the following year. The proportion of salmon fishers
who reported their catch continued to increase from 2018
to 2019. This high level of compliance is perhaps unsurprising given the historic familiarity that Greenlanders
have with reporting marine and terrestrial harvests
(Dahl-Petersen et al., 2014). However, salmon catch
reporting compliance levels have risen from 2017 to 2019,
and is thought to be due in part to the implementation of
new legislation (Government of Greenland, 2020). Using
regulatory deterrents and nudges can help ensure high
levels of compliance into the future (Snyder et al., 2021).
In the face of changes to their routine, fishers do have
the capacity to further comply. Even though fishers can
earn an income from salmon catch, and enforcement is
known to be lacking, few fishers indicated instrumental
motivations to not report all their salmon catch.
While it is not possible from our statistical analysis to
conclusively infer what drives their compliance, fishers
have generally positive perceptions of the regulations that
govern their access and they look positively upon the
authorities that enforce those regulations. In addition,
high levels of compliance, high levels of agreement with
normative attitudes, low levels of instrumental motivations, and high levels of perceived regulatory legitimacy
is auspicious for a future where users, managers, and regulators work together to manage access to Atlantic
salmon stocks. Voluntary compliance can persist if fishery managers are perceived to act professionally,

honestly, and fairly. We anticipate that if Atlantic salmon
stocks continue to decline, what is deemed fair will
become controversial among salmon fishers in
Greenland.
These results also reaffirm the value of the compliance framework approach for understanding compliance
in small-scale fisheries (Oyanedel et al., 2020b;
Ramcilovic-Suominen & Epstein, 2012). Increasing collaboration between salmon fishers and managers is also
likely feasible, given that nearly 60% of Greenland's
salmon fishers said that they would provide more information by SMS message if the means to do so existed.
Salmon fishers' willingness to share observations and
ideas is substantial. The Association of Hunters and Fishers in Greenland (KNAPK) supports this level of communication during annual visits along the coast, and the
sharing of ideas between and across individuals, local
branch managers, and head office officials. Conservationists should continue to engage with local associations and
participate in visits to maintain the common understanding that helps make compliance possible in this fishery.
We illustrate how measuring fishers' attitudes can
identify opportunities that arise for compliance or noncompliance. Crime script analysis, which parses noncompliance into a series of discrete events, identifies the
specific components of salmon fishery compliance with
catch reporting requirements. We identified an individual
process, in this case, how salmon catch reporting is conducted. This isolates the process-based factors that contribute to perceptions of legitimacy, such as the
professional conduct of fishery officers or the ease of
reporting salmon catch. Our survey instrument made it
possible to measure how people report salmon catch,
how they think catch reporting can be improved, and
among which groups salmon catch reporting is most
challenging.
Catch reporting is not mandatory in many recreational fisheries, and as a result, it is not normally possible
to evaluate fisheries compliance by linking survey
responses with official catch records (Midway
et al., 2020). Because we were able to combine these data
types, we can evaluate the possibility of respondent bias,
given that achieving a census was unlikely and representative results are most valuable to fishery managers and
intervention-oriented conservationists. Official catch
records also shed light on the integrity of individual survey questions and associated responses. Salmon fishers
more readily disclosed not reporting all of their catches
when asked indirectly, and at the same time, we observed
six cases where fishers said they reported all their
catches, whereas the official records suggest that they did
not. These six fishers who said that they reported all of
their salmon catch to the Government of Greenland may
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have in fact reported their catch, even though the official
record shows that they did not. It is possible that their
reports could have been submitted, but were either never
received, were never filed, or were submitted incorrectly.
It is also possible that the respondents did not understand
the question, or that they inputted the incorrect response.
Responses to direct questions are doubted for their
veracity, which further justifies the use of UCT for indirectly asking sensitive questions. UCT questions may
increase the estimated incidence of salmon catch underreporting, but our results lack signifance to confidently
support this claim. Even though the UCT estimate is
larger, salmon catch underreporting is small, with <10%
of respondents indirectly indicating that they underreported their salmon catch. These results should be interpreted with the likelihood that both direct and indirect
questions could be underestimated. Apart from the UCT
exercise, all other survey questions were direct questions.
Given that the UCT exercise revealed that direct catch
reporting may be underestimated, it is possible that all
direct questions may be systematically underestimated.
However, the majority of survey questions posed were
not about sensitive behavior, so it is not justifiable to
doubt their accuracy. This specific use of UCT shows that
it can be an easy-to-administer tool (Nuno et al., 2013)
and that UCT can even be conducted via online survey
instruments. Our study reinforces the necessity of carefully selecting both sensitive and nonsensitive items in
the design phase (Hinsley et al., 2017). Though not commonly included, our study provides respondents with a
warm-up, practice UCT question, which gave respondents familiarity with how to answer the question and
provides further assurance that the UCT questions were
answered correctly (Hinsley et al., 2017). However, the
variability that can arise in a UCT must be lessened for
the effect to be detected and interpreted as significant; in
this case, that is not possible. Future studies that use
UCT should take extra care to revise nonsensitive statements and sensitive statements to reduce the likelihood
of variability in the estimate.
The results of this study also reaffirm that illegal
behavior does not always translate to an unwillingness to
divulge information (Hinsley et al., 2019). Instead, this
study shows that illegal behavior can be shared, and we
argue that the triviality of sanctions for such behavior in
this specific setting may explain why resource users are
willing to divulge such information. Linking official
salmon catch records with survey responses also allowed
us to identify an overall lack of variance in responses
between reporters and nonreporters. We hypothesized
that nonreporters have systematically different attitudes
or perspectives to those who do report salmon catch.
With the exception of two questions, we were unable to
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meaningfully show that a fishers' attitudes explain their
actual salmon catch report status. However, results suggest that fishers who do not know how to report salmon
catch or who find salmon catch reporting confusing are
less likely to report salmon catch. There is a need to further simplify reporting to eliminate this confusion.
Greenland's fishery managers also have the opportunity
to familiarize license holders with how to report their
catch when they are issued their licenses, especially
among fishers with less experience in the fishery. As seen
in this study and others, fishers with less experience are
more likely to exhibit involuntary noncompliance, but
experienced fishers can also find the rules confusing
(Jentoft & Mikalsen 2004).
Imbalanced samples are a persistent challenge for
studying noncompliance because we most wish to hear
from people who are understandably reluctant to answer
questions about their noncompliant behavior (Larkin
et al., 2010; van der Hammen et al., 2016). We were
therefore pleased that 9% of responses came from salmon
fishing license holders who did not officially report
salmon catch to the Government of Greenland. This percentage is high, given that only 14% of all salmon fishing
license holders did not report salmon catch in 2019
(Government of Greenland, 2020). While we cannot be
certain, our tests that evaluated differences between the
survey pool and the overall population, as well as comparisons between reporters and nonreporters, give us
confidence that the survey pool is otherwise representative of the salmon fishing license holder population, in
terms of salmon counts, catch, license types, and participating localities. However, we recommend eliciting more
perspectives from the professional salmon fishing population, recognizing that professional salmon fishers are
slightly underrepresented in the survey response pool.
They are also the individuals catching the greatest quantities and weights of salmon. It is possible that this professional segment did not respond to the survey because
they were participating in spring fishing or were affected
by the economic shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic,
which began during the period when the survey was
issued.
Future research could include follow-up surveys by
phone or in person among salmon fishing license holders
who did not submit their salmon catch reports during the
2019 season, or among those who chose not to participate
in the salmon fishing survey. Having their responses
included would capture a more complete picture of what
drives salmon catch reporting. Scholars who are particularly interested in the attitudes of noncompliant resource
users would especially benefit from a more complete survey of nonreporters. We saw a high response rate to the
Salmon Fishing Survey of 37% despite the online format
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and completion during the COVID-19 pandemic. This
participation suggests that Greenlanders have something
to say about salmon fishing and want to be involved in
how Greenland's fisheries are governed. This participation and compliance is consistent with studies that show
that positive perceptions of governance structures are key
to participation and support (Bennett & Dearden, 2014;
Bubier, 1988; Evans et al., 2011). High levels of participation are also an auspicious indicator of research that lives
up to goals and objectives to conduct inclusive, respectful, and beneficial research in, for, and with Inuit communities (National Inuit Strategy on Research, 2018).
These results have been distributed among Greenland's
salmon fishery policymakers and all salmon fishers were
given access to results in summer 2020. They have
informed the dialogue between NASCO members and
Greenland's efforts to manage its access to Atlantic
salmon stocks within its exclusive economic zone. Importantly, they have clarified long-standing beliefs about
underreported salmon catch.
While these results suggest that Greenland's salmon
fishers have high moral standards and enforcement officials
are professional role models, no fishery is flawless. First, it
is not known how many Greenlanders fish for salmon without a license, and unreported salmon catch remains a possibility throughout their ranges (ICES, 2020). Second, salmon
fishers endure structural challenges that limit salmon catch
reporting, such as not having access to the internet or
phone, or reside in localities where they are not as easily
reached by the Association of Hunters and Fishers in
Greenland. Lastly, Greenlanders failed to fish less than or
equal to the quota in 2019 and 2020. As results from the
survey reveal, some fishers take issue with current management plans. This discontent is not new; Greenlanders have
indicated that they would like for managers to keep the season open longer (Nygaard, 2016), while at the same time,
NASCO and other salmon stakeholders continue to encourage Greenland to fish no more than the annual quota.
Individuals' attitudes provide key insights on how they
behave in the immediate regulatory environment in which
their resource use occurs. Linking fishers' attitudes and
their actual reporting behavior is beneficial because it tests
the integrity of the questions that surveyors ask, the prevalence of nonresponse bias, and how much attitudes
between reporters and nonreporters differ. Knowing both
a person's attitudes and behaviors may also reveal structural inequalities that fishers face (Allison & Ellis, 2001;
Fabinyi et al., 2014; Pinkerton, 2017), and as we show, this
linking can even identify technical or clerical issues with
reporting salmon catch, which create opportunities for
noncompliance (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Improving compliance requires consideration for these structural barriers
or situational factors that fishers face, and carrying them
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through the design, implementation, and maintenance of
their management systems. These process-based components of legitimacy are revealed by combining salmon fishers' attitudes and behaviors. The Government of
Greenland has revised salmon reporting protocols based
upon the results of this study (Government of
Greenland, 2020) and there is also an opportunity to
expand the thematic purview of the ICES Atlantic salmon
working group (WGNAS). Including regulatory and
human dimensions research in these fora would help
guide specific policy design and implementation efforts, in
both this and other highly migratory fisheries.
ORCID
Hunter T. Snyder
6563

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1943-

RE FER EN CES
Agrawal, A. (2014). Matching and mechanisms in protected area
and poverty alleviation research. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 111, 3909–3910.
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50, 179–211.
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1980). Understanding attitudes and predicting social behavior. Prentice-Hall.
Allison, E. H., & Ellis, F. (2001). The livelihoods approach and management of small-scale fisheries. Marine Policy, 25, 377–388.
Andreoni, J., Erard, B., & Feinstein, J. (1998). Tax compliance. Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 818–860.
Andrews, E. J., Wolfe, S., Nayak, P. K., & Armitage, D. (2021).
Coastal fishers livelihood behaviors and their psychosocial explanations: Implications for fisheries governance in a changing
world. Frontiers in Marine Science.
Arias, A., & Sutton, S. G. (2013). Understanding recreational fishers'
compliance with no-take zones in the great reef Marine Park.
Ecology and Society, 18, 1–10.
Ban, N. C., Hansen, G. J. A., Jones, M., & Vincent, A. C. J. (2009).
Systematic marine conservation planning in data-poor regions:
Socioeconomic data is essential. Marine Policy, 33, 794–800.
Becker, G.S. & Landes, W.M. (1974). Essays in the economics of
crime and punishment. Human behavior and social institutions. National Bureau of Economic Research: distributed by
Columbia University Press, New York.
Béné, C., Arthur, R., Norbury, H., Allison, E. H., Beveridge, M.,
Bush, S., Campling, L., Leschen, W., Little, D., Squires, D.,
Thilsted, S. H., Troell, M., & Williams, M. (2016). Contribution
of fisheries and aquaculture to food security and poverty reduction: Assessing the current evidence. World Development, 79,
177–196.
Bennett, N. J., & Dearden, P. (2014). Why local people do not support conservation: Community perceptions of marine protected
area livelihood impacts, governance and management in
Thailand. Marine Policy, 44, 107–116.
Bergseth, B. J., Gurney, G. G., Barnes, M. L., Arias, A., &
Cinner, J. E. (2018). Addressing poaching in marine protected
areas through voluntary surveillance and enforcement. Nature
Sustainability, 1, 421–426.

SNYDER ET AL.

Bergseth, B. J., & Roscher, M. (2018). Discerning the culture of
compliance through recreational fisher's perceptions of poaching. Marine Policy, 89, 132–141.
Bergseth, B. J., Williamson, D. H., Russ, G. R., Sutton, S. G., &
Cinner, J. E. (2017). A social-ecological approach to assessing
and managing poaching by recreational fishers. Frontiers in
Ecology and the Environment, 15, 67–73.
Bubier, J. L. (1988). International management of Atlantic salmon:
Equitable sharing and building consensus. Ocean Development & International Law, 19, 35–57.
Cai, J., Zhou, X., Yan, X., Lucente, D., & Lagana, C. (2017). Top
10 species groups in global aquaculture 2017 (Vol. 13). FAO.
Cinner, J. (2018). How behavioral science can help conservation.
Science, 362, 889–890.
Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social change and crime rate
trends: A routine activity approach. American Sociological
Review, 44, 588–608.
Conteh, A., Gavin, M. C., & Solomon, J. (2015). Quantifying illegal
hunting: A novel application of the quantitative randomised
response technique. Biological Conservation, 189, 16–23.
Coutts, E., & Jann, B. (2011). Sensitive questions in online surveys:
Experimental results for the randomized response technique
(RRT) and the unmatched count technique (UCT). Sociological
Methods & Research, 40, 169–193.
Dadswell, M., Spares, A., Reader, J., McLean, M., McDermott, T.,
Samways, K., & Lilly, J. (2021). The decline and impending collapse of the Atlantic Salmon (Salmo salar) population in the
North Atlantic Ocean: A review of possible causes. Reviews in
Fisheries Science & Aquaculture, 0, 1–44.
Inger Katrine Dahl-Petersen, Christina Viskum Lytken Larsen,
Nina Odgaard Nielsen, Marit Eika Jørgensen & Peter
Bjerregaard. (2014). Befolkningsundersøgelsen i Grønland 2014 levevilkår, livsstil og helbred. Statens Institute for Folkesundhed.
Droitcour, J., Caspar, R. A., Hubbard, M. L., Parsley, T. L.,
Visscher, W., & Ezzati, T. M. (2004). The item count technique
as a method of indirect questioning: A review of its development and a case study application. In Measurement errors in
surveys (pp. 185–210). John Wiley & Sons.
Editorial. (1981). Boycott not the answer. The Atlantic Salmon
Journal.
Erbaugh, J. T., Pradhan, N., Adams, J., Oldekop, J. A., Agrawal, A.,
Brockington, D., Pritchard, R., & Chhatre, A. (2020). Global forest restoration and the importance of prioritizing local communities. Nature Ecology & Evolution, 4, 1472–1476.
Evans, L., Cherrett, N., & Pemsl, D. (2011). Assessing the impact of
fisheries co-management interventions in developing countries:
A meta-analysis. Journal of Environmental Management, 92,
1938–1949.
Fabinyi, M., Evans, L., & Foale, S. J. (2014). Social-ecological systems, social diversity, and power: Insights from anthropology
and political ecology. Ecology and Society, 19, 1–12.
Fleming, I. A. (1996). Reproductive strategies of Atlantic salmon:
Ecology and evolution. Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries, 6,
379–416.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (2012).
Improving our knowledge on small-scale fisheries: Data needs
and methodologies. Rome: FAO.
Fulton, E. A., Smith, A. D. M., Smith, D. C., & van Putten, I. E.
(2011). Human behaviour: The key source of uncertainty in

11 of 12

fisheries management: Human behaviour and fisheries management. Fish and Fisheries, 12, 2–17.
Glynn, A. N. (2013). What can we learn with statistical truth
serum?: Design and analysis of the list experiment. Public
Opinion Quarterly, 77, 159–172.
Government of Greenland. (2020). 2019 report on the salmon fishery
in Greenland. Aalisarnermut, Piniarnermut Nunalerinermullu
Naalakkersuisoqarfik Ministry of Fisheries, Hunting and
Agriculture.
Hickey, G. M., Snyder, H. T., DeVries, J. R., & Temby, O. (2021).
On inter-organizational trust, control and risk in transboundary
fisheries governance. Marine Policy, 134, 104772.
Hinsley, A., Keane, A., St. John, F. A. V., Ibbett, H., & Nuno, A.
(2019). Asking sensitive questions using the unmatched count
technique: Applications and guidelines for conservation.
Methods in Ecology and Evolution, 10, 308–319.
Hinsley, A., Nuno, A., Ridout, M., John, F. A. V. S., &
Roberts, D. L. (2017). Estimating the extent of CITES noncompliance among traders and end-consumers; lessons from the
global orchid trade. Conservation Letters, 10, 602–609.
Honey, K. T. (2010). From rags to fishes: Data-poor methods for fishery managers (p. 26). Copenhagen: California Sea Grant College
Program.
Huisman, W., & van Erp, J. (2013). Opportunities for environmental crime: A test of situational crime prevention theory. The
British Journal of Criminology, 53, 1178–1200.
ICES. (2020). Atlantic salmon at West Greenland. Copenhagen:
ICES.
Jentoft, S., & Mikalsen, K. H. (2004). A vicious circle? The dynamics
of rule-making in Norwegian fisheries. Marine Policy, 28,
127–135.
Karper, M. A. M., & Lopes, P. F. M. (2014). Punishment and compliance: Exploring scenarios to improve the legitimacy of smallscale fisheries management rules on the Brazilian coast. Marine
Policy, 44, 457–464.
Kelleher, K., Westlund, L., Hoshino, E., Mills, D., Willmann, R., de
Graaf, G., & Brummett, R. (2012). Hidden harvest: The global
contribution of capture fisheries. WorldFish.
Kosinski, M., Stillwell, D., & Graepel, T. (2013). Private traits and
attributes are predictable from digital records of human behavior. PNAS, 110, 5802–5805.
Kraus, S. J. (1995). Attitudes and the prediction of behavior: A
meta-analysis of the empirical literature. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 21, 58–75.
Kuperan, K., & Sutinen, J. G. (1998). Blue water crime: Deterrence,
legitimacy, and compliance in fisheries. Law & Society Review,
32, 309.
Larkin, M. F., Ault, J. S., Humston, R., & Luo, J. (2010). A mail survey
to estimate the fishery dynamics of southern Florida's bonefish
charter fleet. Fisheries Management and Ecology, 17, 254–261.
Midway, S. R., Adriance, J., Banks, P., Haukebo, S., & Caffey, R.
(2020). Electronic self-reporting: Angler attitudes and behaviors
in the recreational red snapper fishery. North American Journal
of Fisheries Management, 40, 1119–1132.
National Inuit Strategy on Research. (2018). Inuit Tapiriit
Kanatami.
Nelson, R. Κ. (1982). A conservation ethic and environment: The
Koyukon of Alaska. In Resource managers: North American and
Australian hunter-gatherers. Routledge.

12 of 12

Nolte, C., Agrawal, A., Silvius, K. M., & Soares-Filho, B. S. (2013). Governance regime and location influence avoided deforestation success of protected areas in the Brazilian Amazon. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of USA, 110, 4956–4961.
Nuno, A., Bunnefeld, N., Naiman, L. C., & Milner-Gulland, E. J.
(2013). A novel approach to assessing the prevalence and
drivers of illegal bushmeat hunting in the serengeti. Conservation Biology, 27, 1355–1365.
Nygaard, R. (2016). Results of the phone interview survey of
licensed Greenlandic salmon fishermen conducted in February
2016. Working paper 2016/31.
Ostrom, E., Dietz, T., Dolsˇak, N., Stern, P. C., Stonich, S., &
Weber, E. U. (Eds.). (2002). The Drama of the commons.
National Academies Press.
Oyanedel, R., Gelcich, S., & Milner-Gulland, E. J. (2020a). Motivations for (non-)compliance with conservation rules by smallscale resource users. Conservation Letters, 13, 1–9.
Oyanedel, R., Gelcich, S., & Milner-Gulland, E. J. (2020b). A synthesis of (non-)compliance theories with applications to smallscale fisheries research and practice. Fish and Fisheries, 21,
1120–1134.
Parrish, D. L., Behnke, R. J., Gephard, S. R., McCormick, S. D., &
Reeves, G. H. (1998). Why aren't there more Atlantic salmon
(Salmo salar)? Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic
Sciences, 55, 281–287.
Pinkerton, E. (2017). Hegemony and resistance: Disturbing patterns
and hopeful signs in the impact of neoliberal policies on smallscale fisheries around the world. Marine Policy, 80, 1–9.
Poppel, B., & Kruse, J. (2009). The importance of a mixed cash-and
harvest herding based economy to living in the Arctic: an analysis on the survey of living conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA).
Quality of Life and the Millennium Challenge, 35, 27–42.
Raakjær Nielsen, J. (2003). An analytical framework for studying:
Compliance and legitimacy in fisheries management. Marine
Policy, 27, 425–432.
Ramcilovic-Suominen, S., & Epstein, G. (2012). Towards an analytical framework for forest law compliance. International Forestry
Review, 14, 326–336.
Sandström, A., Crona, B., & Bodin, Ö. (2014). Legitimacy in
co-management: The impact of preexisting structures, social
networks and governance strategies: Legitimacy in co-management. Environmental Policy and Governance, 24, 60–76.
Sheehan, T. (2019). Current status of knowledge, data, and research
efforts on Atlantic Salmon at Greenland: What do we have, what
do we need, and what should we do moving forward?. US
Department Commerce.
Smith, H., & Basurto, X. (2019). Defining small-scale fisheries and
examining the role of science in shaping perceptions of who
and what counts: A systematic review. Frontiers in Marine Science. https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2019.00236

SNYDER ET AL.

Snyder, H. T., Cox, M. E., Bork Hansen, S., Connors, C., &
Eckstein, S. (2021). Deterrents and nudges improve compliance
in Greenland's Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) fishery. ICES
Journal of Marine Science, 78, 2809–2817.
Snyder, H. T., & Erbaugh, J. T. (2020). Fishery observers address
arctic fishery discards. Environmental Research Letters, 15,
0940c4.
Snyder, H. T., Olsen, N. L., & Song, A. M. (2020). How cybernetics
explains institutional failure: A case of Greenland's open-air
fish markets. Marine Policy, 117, 103882.
Sutinen, J. G., & Andersen, P. (1985). The economics of fisheries
law enforcement. Land Economics, 61, 387.
Thomas, A. S., Gavin, M. C., & Milfont, T. L. (2015). Estimating
non-compliance among recreational fishers: Insights into factors affecting the usefulness of the randomized response and
item count techniques. Biological Conservation, 189, 24–32.
Thomas, A. S., Milfont, T. L., & Gavin, M. C. (2016). A new
approach to identifying the drivers of regulation compliance
using multivariate Behavioural models. PLoS One, 11,
e0163868.
Thorstad, E. B., Bliss, D., Breau, C., Damon-Randall, K., SundtHansen, L. E., Hatfield, E. M. C., Horsburgh, G., Hansen, H.,
Maoiléidigh, N. Ó., Sheehan, T., & Sutton, S. G. (2021). Atlantic
salmon in a rapidly changing environment: Facing the challenges of reduced marine survival and climate change. Aquatic
Conservation: Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems, 31, 1–12.
van der Hammen, T., de Graaf, M., & Lyle, J. M. (2016). Estimating
catches of marine and freshwater recreational fisheries in The
Netherlands using an online panel survey. ICES Journal of
Marine Science, 73, 441–450.
van Putten, I. E., Kulmala, S., Thébaud, O., Dowling, N., Hamon,
K. G., Hutton, T., & Pascoe, S. (2012). Theories and behavioural
drivers underlying fleet dynamics models: Theories and behavioural drivers. Fish and Fisheries, 13, 216–235.

SU PP O R TI N G I N F O RMA TI O N
Additional supporting information can be found online
in the Supporting Information section at the end of this
article.
How to cite this article: Snyder, H. T., Oyanedel,
R., Sneddon, C. S., & Scheld, A. M. (2022).
Attitudes and behaviors for understanding
compliance in Greenland's Atlantic salmon (Salmo
salar) fishery. Conservation Science and Practice,
e12775. https://doi.org/10.1111/csp2.12775

